British foreign and imperial policy, which in turn necessitated a sensitive and discreet immigration policy. 3 This article examines the essential imperial and international context of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, and argues that the foundational deliberations that produced the White Australia Policy cannot be fully understood without attention to that global perspective.
Indeed, the real and potential implications of Asian restriction beyond the Australian continent dominated the parliamentary debates and influenced the character and application of the policy from the outset. The debate was not about whether to implement a restrictive immigration regime, it was about how to implement that regime, a calculus suffused with a range of imperial and international considerations. It hinged upon Labor Party leader John C. Watson's popular amendment, which scorned the Natal formula's discretion and instead expressly excluded 'any person who is an aboriginal native of Asia, Africa, or of the islands thereof'. The question of whether to risk embarrassing the British, Japanese, and Chinese governments by enacting open and explicit restriction-as advocated by proponents of the Watson amendment-or whether to disguise the legislation's intent and spare Britain's sensibilities along with the prestige of its friends, colonies, and partners-as preferred by Edmund Barton's Protectionist Ministry and the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London-therefore guided the discussion. Ultimately, the Barton government's indulgence of the Natal formula was vigorously contested and the central device at the core of the White Australia Policy-the notorious literacy test-was never a foregone conclusion. This illustrates that while the White Australia Policy was a racialized act of 'self-conscious nation building', as John Fitzgerald argues, it was also a consciously and deliberately imperial and international act that imparted a distinctly global inflection to the Australian nation building project at its inception. 4 Existing studies of the White Australia Policy offer a mostly cursory discussion of the extent to which members of the first Commonwealth Parliament purposefully framed and vigorously debated their actions in the wider global context of British imperial and foreign policy. That indispensable context is often simply asserted rather than unraveled and analyzed.
The influence of Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and his favored Natal formula is well known, but the fact that Commonwealth legislators adopted this policy only after a turbulent debate has received much less scholarly attention. That character of that debate is important because it reveals the extent to which imperial and international concerns influenced Australian legislators as they enacted Asian immigration restriction in 1901.
Histories of the White Australia Policy's institution-from the first studies by Myra Willard, A.T. Yarwood, and H.I. London, to later contributions by James Jupp and Keith Windschuttle-tend to only allude to the Immigration Restriction Bill's global connotations.
Much of the analysis instead focuses on legislators' domestic rationales and motivations. 5 Willard barely acknowledges the broader imperial and international content or contentiousness of the debates in her important early account. Yarwood likewise offers a short but useful overview of Japanese intercessions during the deliberations, yet his discussion of the actual debates remains focused upon the Immigration Restriction Bill's racial and economic dimensions. He even goes so far as to suggest that the White Australia Policy actually limited international discord by 'preventing the growth of minorities whose presence might have led to recurring diplomatic crises'. Similarly, H.I. London's brief overview of the legislation's development recognizes the later diplomatic burdens engendered by the White Australia fantasy, but presents them as largely a feature of the post-Second World War era. 6 Contrary to the assertions of Yarwood and London, the White Australia Policy in fact constituted a diplomatic millstone for both Australia and Great Britain from its inception in 1901, as the formative debates examined in this article reveal. forced prospective immigrants-regardless of race-to transcribe a passage in English.
Immigration officials adjudicated the potential immigrant's language facility and could therefore surreptitiously exclude Asians on educational rather than racial grounds. 14 Chamberlain's compromise mitigated the most tactless insensitivities of colonial prejudice, but Australian legislators only reluctantly incorporated the Natal formula into their expanded immigration restriction regime in 1901 as the following discussion demonstrates. They did so under duress from British, Japanese, and Indian representatives.
When federation finally came, the overwhelming majority of Australia's first parliament agreed with Barton that Asian immigration must be subject to restriction, and that support cut across every social, political, and economic affiliation. The question hinged upon how to implement that restriction, and it was here that partisan loyalties took some unexpected twists. Britain. Imperial authorities in London, Calcutta, and elsewhere could not countenance outright racist regulations against subjects of Britain's larger (and largely non-white) empire, nor would the British Foreign Office tolerate slights against subjects of British allies and partners abroad.
And yet there were those in the Australian Parliament who believed that any prevarication on the subject of Asian exclusion promised only disaster for the Commonwealth and its status as a selfgoverning colony founded upon bedrock principles of white political and economic citizenship.
A strong British Empire, they claimed, would not benefit from a racially heterogeneous Australia. From its inception, then, the White Australia Policy was a source of contention and anxiety not only in Australian politics, but also in British imperial and international politics. Character, Barton proclaimed that 'we are guarding the last part of the world in which the higher races can live and increase freely for the higher civilization'. According to Pearson, the dominant white races would eventually face an unassailable racial, economic, and diplomatic challenge from nonwhites, whereupon whites would 'wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs'. 16 From Barton's perspective, then, this was the broader challenge that white Australians were destined to meet, not only on behalf of the Commonwealth's future generations but also for the welfare of the world's white races. 
The Immigration Restriction Bill and Imperial Politics
The choice between the Natal formula's deception and the Watson amendment's forthright exclusion dominated the rest of the parliamentary debates, and pitted consideration for I hold that if we are perfectly sure that a certain policy is necessary to uphold the purity of the race in Australia…I do not think we should hesitate, for one moment, under the peculiar circumstances of the case-with our position in these southeastern seas, open to millions of these servile and alien people-to say to Great Britain, "This is a problem which you and we have to face, and the more honestly we face it the better for the future". and race loomed large in his rationale. He accepted that fears of economic competition were justified, but his primary concern was 'the possibility and probability of racial contamination'.
Moreover, he contended that the British government's objections on imperial grounds were misplaced. Constitutionally, Indians were merely subjects in contrast to Australians who were also citizens, he argued. 22 This presumably circumscribed the rights of Indians to protest their treatment.
Many Members of Parliament in fact doubted that Great Britain would actually veto legislation that prohibited non-white immigration outright. They had to know that a white ' We cannot understand how it is that our own Government now wish to separate us from herself and to put us as strangers along with the outside nations of the world', they wrote, 'especially as it is very painful for us to be put along with the Chinese, who are a defeated and dying race'. They reminded Chamberlain of India's great sacrifices in defense of the empire. Indians had demonstrated their willingness 'to give their blood wherever the British Government has asked for water'. Their petition provides a rare glimpse into this debate's effect on Australia's small Indian community:
We are therefore greatly pained that there is so much talk about a white Australia. Is it our fault that the almighty God made us of dark-coloured skin, and are we (who are part of the Empire) to be cast off and put along with the Chinese and Japanese, 27 Ibid., p. The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher than that of Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians, or other Eastern peoples, that to refer to them in the same terms cannot but be regarded in the light of a reproach, which is hardly warranted by the fact of the shade of the national complexion.
He further dismissed the widely held Australian conviction that Japan sought an outlet for its surplus population. Eitaki hoped, therefore, that Barton would exempt Japanese immigrants from the proposed bill. Independent Labor member James Wilkinson was equally blunt in his judgment. 'Are we afraid of offending Japan?' he asked, 'shall we put our fear of offending Japan above our desire to have a pure Australian race comprised of the best-blood of Europe, which has made the British race what it is to-day?' Wilkinson did not believe Australians should place British and Japanese sensibilities above that cherished racial objective.
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Attorney General Alfred Deakin nevertheless gave one of the most impassioned speeches in support of the government's legislation and against the Watson amendment on international grounds. He admitted that parliament was unquestionably engaged in establishing a policy of world-historical significance. Furthermore, there was no question that Australia was to be a white man's country, and Deakin was confident that 'at the very first instant of our national career we are as one for a white Australia.' That policy, he declared, was to be 'the Monroe Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Australia.' 37 President James Monroe's 1823 declaration warned Europe's imperial powers to respect the western hemisphere's independence. Australians were now claiming racial suzerainty over an entire continent. International observers had derided the former policy upon its promulgation in 1823, Deakin reminded his colleagues, yet eighty years later it was diplomatic orthodoxy. Australia's equally pretentious claims would meet with international ridicule, Deakin conceded. European observers would likely watch with amazement when they regard what appears to be the arrogance of a handful of white men, most of them clustered on the eastern littoral of this immense continent, adopted before they have effectively occupied a quarter of the continent, and with the great bulk of its immense extent little more than explored or with a sparse European settlement.
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Nevertheless, Deakin counseled consideration of Japan's national pride and effusively praised Japan's recent economic, political, and military development. He insisted that it was the Japanese migrant's capacity for education, industriousness, and thrift that made them undesirable in Australia, since they threatened to displace white workers who demanded higher wages and better conditions. Deakin left no doubt that they ought to be excluded, but he was adamant that their exclusion had to be handled sensitively. 'When it becomes necessary for us to exclude people like the Japanese', he warned, 'it is reasonable that we should exclude them in the most considerate manner possible, and without conveying any idea that we have confused them with the many uneducated savages who visit our shores.' Deakin was aware that Japanese representatives like Eitaki were scrutinising the parliamentary debates. He was therefore eager to appease Japanese pride, recognizing that 'to lump all these peoples together as Asiatics and undesirables would naturally be offensive to a high-spirited people like the Japanese.' 39 The adoption of the Natal formula and rejection of the tactless Watson amendment constituted the only way to avoid injury to Japan and to ensure Australia's future as a white continent. was eager 'to insure that Australia shall be white, and that we shall be free for all time from the contamination and the degrading influence of inferior races'. Nature had drawn the color line and the stakes, Isaacs argued, could not be higher:
I recognise to the fullest that here in Australia we have a white man's war. It is a struggle for life; it is a struggle for that higher and fuller life that all progressive nations must feel and share in. It is that struggle for victory over adverse circumstances which is the pride and glory of all advancing civilizations. It is a white man's war that we must face, and I would not suffer any black or tinted man to come in and block the path to progress. I would resist to the utmost, if it were necessary, any murky stream from disturbing the current of Australian life. 'the public have been told over and over again that the purity and whiteness of the Australian Commonwealth is being endangered by the incursion of these hordes of Asiatics. I say that it is a fable; that it is altogether a fairy story.' 47 With faint praise, he deftly captured the absurdity of parliament's position: 'I think it is a humiliating confession to go forth to the world from one in so high a position that the truth is that we are afraid to come into contact and competition with a race like the Japanese.' 48 Such comparatively progressive statements were hardly calculated to of any of the nationalities I have mentioned may be examined in his own language, the same courtesy should not be extended to a Japanese. 52 Unable to elicit a satisfactory response from Barton, Eitaki turned to the GovernorGeneral. The substitution of European for English was 'racial, pure and simple' he protested. 53 The Japanese Minister in London made similar representations to the British Foreign Office. 54 Eitaki kept his Foreign Ministry apprised of parliamentary debates, and Ambassador Hayashi was equally distressed by the proceedings' tone. As he complained to the British Foreign Office, Australian legislators 'explain that the measure imposes an educational qualification without distinction of race or colour', yet at the same time 'they couple it with such monstrous declarations'. 55 Nevertheless, in correspondence with the Foreign Office Chamberlain once again expressed his view that the European language stipulation wholly comported with the Natal formula. As such he could not interfere with Australia's legislation. 56 As Chamberlain speciously told the Foreign Office, '[Hayashi] must take account of the words of the Bill itself, not of words uttered during debate which have no binding force whatsoever.' 57 In particular, Chamberlain was reportedly concerned that if Britain disallowed the bill, 'the only result would be the passage of an even more drastic measure, framed with less consideration for the feelings of Japan, and possibly containing a direct prohibition of the entry of Japanese into Australia.' it is difficult indeed to understand, in the face of the existence of an Act whose test Clause provides for an examination 'in a European language', and whose passage was assisted (if not absolutely secured) by declarations from responsible Ministers that it was directly aimed at the Japanese, and would not be applied to white residents of European countries, how anyone can claim there is no discrimination against Japanese subjects in any Australian legislation. Empire. Rather, it heralded the beginning of a prolonged imperial and international dispute concerning Asian immigrants' rights in the British colonies of settlement. 62 Australians, after all,
were not alone in legislating against Asian immigration. Canada, New Zealand, and Natal all enacted similar legislation during this period. The Immigration Restriction Act may have 62 As described by Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line.
provided 'a stone wall against the danger of race pollution', as the Sydney Morning Herald hoped it would in September 1901, but it did not submerge the imperial and diplomatic tensions that afflicted it from the outset.
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